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This paper intends to study the analytical relationship between the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
economic nature and the concrete governance modalities used to manage these IPR. This problematic may be 
extended to the economic analyze of Property Rights (PR) in general, and is related to various social fields: the 
environmental components, the cultural goods and services, the knowledge production and the digital economy, for 
example. 
In a first part, from stylized facts, I will show how the market private logic translates high transaction costs, 
i.e. transaction costs generally  higher than the ones produced by other governance mechanisms. In regard to hold-up 
strategies and collective welfare, I will  underline the intrinsic market failures related with a private logic. Then, I 
will examine the implications in terms of market structures, firms strategies and PR economic nature. I will show 
why, in regard to the modifications of the goods and services economic nature, new forms of collective PR appear. 
Then, from the opposition between Pigou and Coase, I will study the different conceptions of the PR 
economic nature, and of  the market regulations recommended. I will analyze  this opposition in regard to the 
following points: the externalities economic nature, the nature of the contracts and the criterion used to evaluate the 
social welfare. I will show why Coase maintains the main neoclassical hypotheses, i.e. the absence of uncertainty 
and the microeconomic substantive rationality. 
In a second part, I will point out, in regard to the goods and services complexity, the private negotiation 
limits, i.e. the coasian approach limits. This complexity may be defined (i) by the uncertainty, (ii) by the fact that 
more part of theses goods and services are experience goods, and (iii) by the existence of opportunist behaviors. The 
first characteristic means that the microeconomic rationality is bounded and that agents´ decisions are irreversible. 
The second one, that the price system is a “noisy” signal and that it is impossible to anticipate the goods and services 
utility. From the third characteristic, we can deduce that the contracts are incomplete, by nature.  
In this perspective, I will use amply Williamson´s theoretical instrumental to demonstrate that the market 
logic translates a high level transaction costs. The concept of complexity may be complemented by the concept of 
specificities, in the way it is defined by Williamson; the more complex and specific are the goods and the assets, the 
higher are the transaction costs related to a market logic . The implications are the following ones: first, the private 
logic and/or the market aren´t, systematically,  the most efficient social instance, in the way that these private logics 
don´t minimize the transaction cost. Secondly, the transaction costs are a way to minimize the uncertainty. Third, 
other governance modalities (institutional, public or hybrid ones) may be more efficient than the private ones.  
Then, I will formalize some of the main  economic mechanisms: I will show the principal differences 
between the paretien maximization criterion used by the pigouvian approach and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion which 
corresponds to the coasian analysis.  Then, I will demonstrate why, in regard to the economic specificities, it is 
impossible to maximize microeconomic production and consumption function. Finally, I will analyze the hold-up 
mechanism: I will demonstrate why, in situations in which the PR are fragmented between various firms, the price 
of the technology is higher than it would be if only one agent had the totality of PR.  
Finally, I will demonstrate why, when opportunist behaviors appear, a pigouvian tax is necessary to turn the 
private negotiation efficient in a social way: in other words, the market efficiency cannot  be implemented without 
an institutional intervention.  
In conclusion,  it is possible to affirm  the necessity of an institutional component, to regulate the market 
activities, and to specify what is  the most efficient governance modality  to be adopted. From an institutional 
perspective, and more specifically from the “old institutional” approach,  this means that the market, i.e the IPR 
private negotiation modalities, can´t be conceived as an optimal mechanism and as an auto-regulatory instance; 
institutional components are necessary for the market work "normally". 
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